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As teenagers explore their sexuality and seek to memorialize and exchange information related to their 
sexual development, their instantaneous ability to memorialize and share images with others, via cell 
phones or the Internet, presents a host of new problems to which our society must respond intelligently. 
The recent trend of harshly punishing these teens under the child pornography regime is not an intelligent 
solution. In light of this wave of prosecutorial overreaching, state and federal child pornography laws 
should be revised to specifically exempt sexting by minors from the reach of such laws. Child 
pornography laws were created to punish and deter a far different class of conduct—the conduct of adult 
pedophiles creating and disseminating images that depict sexual abuse of their child victims in a 
commercial context—not the conduct of older minors using technology to explore their sexuality and 
voluntarily exchange images with one another. Non-obscene depictions of nudity or sexual conduct 
created by teens and exchanged voluntarily among themselves for noncommercial purposes should be 
specifically excluded from the applicable definitions of child pornography and similar crimes. Instances of 
sexting, however, should not necessarily go unpunished, as they may constitute harmful invasions of the 
subject’s privacy. In cases in which nude or sexually themed images of minors, which were initially 
created with the subject’s consent, are disseminated or otherwise made available without or beyond the 
scope of the subject’s consent, such conduct should be cognizable as actionable invasions of the 
subject’s privacy under the publication of private facts branch of this common law tort. The subject 
should be able to seek relief not only against the individual who made such images available without her 
consent, but also against a website that continues to host such images after being notified of their 
presence. Websites that continue to facilitate the hosting of such images after the subject requests their 
removal should lose their immunity for hosting such content and should be held liable for facilitating the 
invasion of the subject’s privacy. 
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Romeo and Juliet Online and In Trouble: 
Criminalizing Depictions of Teen Sexuality 
(c u l8r: g2g 2 jail) 
- Dawn C. Nunziato1 
[T]eenagers engaging in sexual activity . . . is a fact of modern society and has 
been a theme in art and literature throughout the ages.2 
I. Introduction 
Consider the tales of Alice and Bob and Carol and Dave, two sets of young lovers.  Alice 
and Bob decide one night, in the midst of their lovemaking, to memorialize the event and take 
some racy—but not obscene—pictures with Bob’s cell phone.  Across town, Carol and Dave 
have the same idea, and Dave takes similar pictures with his cell phone.  Bob and Dave decide to 
share these images with their lovers via text messaging using their cell phones or by uploading 
them onto their personal computers.  Perhaps Bob and Dave take the further step of sharing these 
images with others. 
Fast-forward six months.  As a result of his actions, Bob is facing the possibility of life in 
prison, while Dave’s actions are not even plausibly criminal.  Wherein lies the difference?  Bob 
and his lover are seventeen years old, while Dave and his lover are eighteen.  Because Bob’s 
lover is under the age of majority, he is subject to far more severe punishment than is Dave.  This 
anomalous result contravenes our general expectations of our legal system, which imposes 
gentler punishments on minors than on adults.3 
1 Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.  I am grateful to Dean Frederick Lawrence 
for his generous financial support.  I am also thankful for the helpful comments of Jonathan Lowy, for the excellent 
editorial assistance of Pat Balakrishnan, for the superb research assistance of Robert Arcamona, Thomas Hayne, 
Bridget Rochester, Megan Zaidan, and Kenneth Rodriguez. 
2 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002). 
3 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00–70.10 (McKinney 2009) (setting lower minimum and maximum prison 
terms for juveniles); IOWA CODE ANN. § 903.1(1)(a), (3) (West Supp. 2011) (allowing for a juvenile’s simple 
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Enter the world of “sexting,” where prosecutors throughout the United States have 
invoked the regime of child pornography to impose harsh penalties on those involved with 
creating, possessing, or distributing sexually themed images of minors, as Part II discusses.4  
Because the subject of Bob’s photographs is seventeen years old, under federal and state child 
pornography laws Bob can be criminally charged with creating, possessing, and distributing 
child pornography.5  In several instances throughout the country, prosecutors have wielded their 
power to go after minors such as Bob who, with the help of new technologies like cell phones, 
web cams, e-mail, and social networking sites, create and exchange sexually themed images of 
themselves and their intimate acquaintances. 
Bob’s conduct—taking and sharing a photograph of a seventeen-year-old girl in a state of 
undress or engaged in a sexual act—technically falls within most state and federal child 
pornography laws.  However, those laws were created to punish and deter a far different class of 
conduct—adults’ creation and dissemination of images that depict sexual abuse of child victims.  
The creation and dissemination of true child pornography is a universally condemned act that is 
appropriately subject to some of the harshest penalties under the law.  This Article contends that 
Bob’s conduct, however, is not true child pornography and the law should not treat it as such.  
Federal and state child pornography laws should be revised to expressly exempt Bob’s conduct 
from their reach.  Although it may be proper to hold Bob liable for violating Alice’s privacy if he 
shares such images without Alice’s consent, he should not be subject to the same penalties as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
misdemeanor sentence to consist of community service or a fine up to $100, while an adult must pay $50 to $100 or 
serve up to thirty days in prison). 
4 See examples infra, text accompanying notes 9–61. 
5 See infra Part III. 
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true child pornographer.  Moreover, Bob and Alice enjoy a First Amendment right to create and 
share depictions of themselves engaged in sexual activity to which they can legally consent. 
Part II of this Article analyzes some recent instances in which minors were threatened 
with and subject to child pornography charges for sexting.  Part III examines the law of child 
pornography and the stringent constitutional requirements imposed by the Supreme Court upon 
legislative efforts to proscribe sexually themed content involving minors.  Part IV then explores 
the constitutional rights enjoyed by minors generally and minors’ right to engage in sexually 
themed expression specifically.  Part V proposes revisions to state child pornography laws to 
exempt acts of sexting from their reach.  Finally, Part VI contends that while sexting should not 
be criminally punishable as child pornography, it should be actionable as an invasion of the 
subject’s privacy if the subject did not consent.  Further, social networking sites should not be 
immune from liability for facilitating such invasions of privacy. 
II. The Back Story: Recent Sexting Prosecutions 
Over the past several years, as cell phones with built-in digital cameras and social 
networking sites facilitating the posting of digital images have become increasingly popular, 
teenagers (among others) have begun using these technologies with greater frequency.  Many of 
these teens, who have just begun exploring their sexuality, use these technologies to engage in 
what has become known as “sexting”—the taking and sharing of sexually themed images of 
themselves or others via their cell phones or using web cams in conjunction with popular social 
networking sites like MySpace and Facebook.  Teens habitually use these technologies to 
connect with their peers in general by talking, texting, and creating and sharing images, video, 
and audio.  They have also increasingly used cell phones and social networking sites to explore 
their sexuality by exchanging sexually themed communications of all types.  This confluence of 
sexual coming of age and ever-advancing technologies has changed the means teenagers use to 
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express themselves, but the underlying messages they express are largely the same as those of 
prior generations and as old as Shakespeare’s tale of star-crossed young lovers. 
One such means of exploration and communication is sexting.  A 2008 survey found that 
approximately twenty percent of all teenagers between thirteen and nineteen years old have sent 
or posted nude or semi-nude pictures of themselves, including twenty-two percent of teen girls, 
eighteen percent of teen boys, and eleven percent of younger teen girls between the ages of 
thirteen and sixteen.6  A survey released in December 2009 by the Pew Research Center’s 
Internet and American Life Project (Pew Report) made similar findings, including that fifteen 
percent of cell-phone owning teenagers ages twelve to seventeen have received a sexually 
suggestive nude or semi-nude image or video of someone they know via text message.7  The 
Pew Report also examined the social contexts in which teenagers engage in such 
communications and found that sexting occurs most often in the following contexts:  exchanges 
of images solely between two romantic partners; exchanges between partners that are then shared 
outside the relationship; and exchanges between people who are not yet in a relationship, but 
where one person hopes to enter into such a relationship.  According to the Pew Report, 
Sexually suggestive images have become a form of relationship currency. . . .  
These images are shared as a part of or instead of sexual activity, or as a way of 
starting or maintaining a relationship with a significant other.  And they are also 
passed along to friends for their entertainment value, as a joke or for fun.8 
                                                 
6 NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY 
OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS (2008), available at 
www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf.  The study makes clear, however, that the 
survey respondents do not constitute a probability sample, as the respondents were selected from those who 
volunteered to participate in the marketing company’s online surveys. 
7 AMANDA LENHART, PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS AND SEXTING: HOW AND WHY MINOR TEENS ARE SENDING 
SEXUALLY SUGGESTIVE NUDE OR NEARLY NUDE IMAGES VIA TEXT MESSAGING, (2009) [hereinafter PEW REPORT], 
available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/teens-and-sexting.pdf. 
8 Teens and Sexting: Overview, PEW INTERNET (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/Teens-and-Sexting.aspx; see also PEW REPORT, supra note 7.  In other 
key findings, the Report found that there was no gender difference in the sending of sexting images, that older teens 
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As challenging as it may be for many concerned parents, teenagers’ use of such 
technology for general purposes has become an integral part of their creativity, self-actualization, 
and socialization in today’s inter-networked society.  But the ability to capture images and video 
by simply pressing a button on a palm-sized device that is always at hand can create serious 
problems for both the would-be subject and the photographer or videographer.  This is especially 
true when the images captured are of an embarrassing or intimate nature.  The ability to 
instantaneously capture and share images with others, via cell phones or the Internet, presents a 
host of new problems.  The question becomes how to respond reasonably, effectively, and 
compassionately to the problems that teenagers’ use and misuse of new technologies raises.  This 
Article contends that the response of throwing the book at teenagers—in particular, the draconian 
book of child pornography laws—is unduly harsh, unreasonable, and indeed violates these 
teenagers’ (and their parents’) First Amendment and privacy rights. 
In several states, teenagers engaging in acts of sexting have been arrested for child 
pornography and related crimes.9  In some cases, teenagers were threatened with prosecution and 
faced severe, life-altering sanctions for engaging in such conduct.  Although such conduct should 
not be encouraged, it should not be the subject of child pornography prosecution, either.  
Consider the cases of three girls from Pennsylvania—Marissa Miller, Grace Kelly, and (the 
pseudonymous) Nancy Doe.  About three years ago, when Marissa and Grace were twelve or 
thirteen, they attended a party where some pictures were taken.  Some of these pictures show 
                                                                                                                                                             
are much more likely to send and receive these images, that more intense users of cell phones are more likely to 
receive sext images, and that eighteen percent of teen cell phone owners with unlimited texting plans have received 
such images compared with eight percent of teens on limited plans and three percent of teens who pay per message. 
See Anne Collier, Sexting: New Study & the ‘Truth or Dare’ Scenario, CONNECT SAFELY (Dec. 15, 2009), available 
at http://www.connectsafely.org/NetFamilyNews/sexting-new-study-a-the-truth-or-dare-scenario.html. 
9 Some examples include Alabama, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Judith Levine, What’s the Matter with Teen Sexting?, AM. 
PROSPECT (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=whats_the_matter_with_teen_sexting. 
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Marissa and her longtime friend Grace from the waist up.10  They are wearing opaque training 
bras and lying side by side, and one of them is talking on the phone while the other is making a 
peace sign.11  In another photograph, Nancy Doe is standing outside of a shower with a towel 
wrapped around her body beneath her breasts.12  None of these photographs depict sexual 
activity of any kind, and while the picture of Nancy Doe depicted her partially nude, the pictures 
of Marissa and Grace did not.  In October 2008, some time after the pictures were taken, school 
officials discovered these photographs on several students’ cell phones.13  The school officials 
confiscated the students’ cell phones and turned them over to George Skumanick, the District 
Attorney of Wyoming County, Pennsylvania, who initiated an extensive and ill-conceived 
criminal investigation into this matter.14 
In February 2009, District Attorney Skumanick wrote a letter to the parents of Marissa, 
Grace, and Nancy, as well as to the parents of about twenty other students who were depicted in 
those photos or found to have the photos on their cell phones.15  In his letter, Skumanick 
threatened the students with child pornography charges unless those involved agreed to the 
equivalent of a guilty plea.16  This included being placed on probation and attending a re-
education program devised to help the girls “gain an understanding of how their actions were 
                                                 
10 Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2010). 
11 Complaint at para. 22, Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (No. 3:09cv540). 
12 Miller, 598 F.3d at 144. 
13 Id. at 143. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Miller, 598 F.3d at 143–44.  Skumanick advised the girls and their parents that in order to avoid charges, they 
must “finalize the paperwork for [an] informal adjustment,” which is the equivalent of “a guilty plea in the juvenile-
delinquency context allowing for probation before judgment.” Complaint, supra note 11, at para. 43 (citing 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6323). 
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wrong” and “what it means to be a girl.”17  In his letter, the district attorney invited the parents to 
attend a meeting to discuss the details of the program.18  Skumanick informed the parents that 
while participation in the re-education program was “voluntary,” he would file charges against 
students who did not participate in or successfully complete the program.19  He also informed a 
group of parents and students that he had the authority to prosecute those involved in making 
available pictures of girls photographed in their underwear, or even of girls photographed 
wearing bikinis.20  The criminal statutes with which the students were charged carry seven-year 
prison sentences and juveniles convicted of these charges would have permanent records, since 
the charges are felonies.21  Furthermore, if convicted of such offenses, juveniles over fourteen 
years of age would be required under the state’s version of Megan’s Law to register as sex 
offenders for at least ten years and to have their names and pictures displayed on the state’s sex-
offender website.22  At the meeting, Skumanick informed the parents that he was prepared to file 
felony charges against any of their children who refused to agree to his deal within 48 hours.23 
The vast majority of the parties chose to accept the district attorney’s deal.24  The parents 
of Marissa Miller, Grace Kelly, and Nancy Doe instead opted to sue the district attorney for, 
                                                 
17 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (M.D. Pa 2009), aff’d sub nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 
139, 144 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Sues Wyoming County D.A. for 
Threatening Teenage Girls with Child Pornography Charges Over Photos of Themselves, (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-sues-wyoming-county-da-threatening-teenage-girls-child-
pornography-charg; Shannon P. Duffy, ACLU Sues NE Pa. DA over Threats Leveled at Teens: Criminal 
Consequences of ‘Sexting’ at Issue in Federal Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 26, 2009, at 1. 
18 Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d at 144. 
19 Id. 
20 Press Release, ACLU, supra note 17. 
21 Complaint, supra note 11, at para. 16. 
22 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9791 (2010)). 
23 Complaint, supra note 11, at para. 34. 
24 Id. at para. 45 (“[E]very parent and minor, except the three families represented in this action, acceded to 
Skumanick’s demands under threat of felony prosecution and accepted the informal adjustment.”). 
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among other things, violating their children’s First Amendment rights.25  Specifically, the 
parents alleged that the district attorney violated their children’s rights by retaliating against their 
children for exercising those rights.26  Were it not for the legal challenge brought by the parents 
of Marissa Miller, Grace Kelly, and Nancy Doe, the district attorney would have enjoyed 
unfettered discretion to threaten dozens of teenagers with child pornography-related charges 
premised on acts of sexting.27 
Consider further the case of A.H., a sixteen-year-old Florida teenager, and her seventeen-
year-old boyfriend J.G.W., who took digital photographs of themselves naked and engaged in 
sexual activity.28  The couple uploaded these photographs to A.H.’s home computer and e-
mailed them to J.G.W., who could then access them on his home computer.29  The couple did not 
further share these images with anyone else.30  As a result, both A.H. and J.G.W. faced second-
degree felony charges under Florida’s child pornography laws, which prohibit individuals from 
“producing, directing or promoting a photograph or representation that they knew to include the 
sexual conduct of a child.”31  J.G.W. also faced one count of possession of child pornography.32 
                                                 
25  Complaint, supra note 11, at paras. 4–5. 
26 Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010).  Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected 
rights “is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution” and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The 
Third Circuit decision is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 205–211. 
27 However, while this case was on appeal, Skumanick was defeated by Jeff Mitchell in the November 2009 
election, in the campaign for which Skumanick’s prosecutorial decision to pursue this case was an issue.  While it is 
impossible to say if this case was determinative, Skumanick had been in office since 1989 and his defeat was 
somewhat of a surprise. See Robert L. Baker, Mitchell Upsets DA Skumanick, WYOMING COUNTY PRESS EXAMINER 
(Nov. 11, 2009), http://wcexaminer.com/index.php/archives/news/7550. 
28 A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 239–40 (Padovano, J., dissenting). 
31 Id. at 235 (majority opinion) (citing FLA. STAT. § 827.071(3) (2005)). 
32 See id. at 235 n.1 (noting that he was charged under FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5)). 
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A.H. contested these charges, claiming that criminal prosecution under the state’s child 
pornography statute violated her constitutional rights, including her right to privacy.33  She 
maintained that the Florida constitution protects her right to engage in sexual activity with her 
boyfriend and that her right to privacy allows her to memorialize these actions in digital images 
and to share these photographs with her boyfriend.34  A.H. further claimed that the state’s action 
was unconstitutional on the ground that prosecuting her for felony child pornography was not the 
least intrusive means of advancing any compelling state interest in preventing such behavior.35  
The court disagreed, holding that the state has a compelling interest in protecting children from 
sexual “exploitation,” regardless of whether the person charged is an adult or a minor (or the 
“child” herself).36  The court held that prosecution under the child pornography statute is the 
least intrusive means of furthering the state’s interest and that A.H. did not enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the circumstances to create or disseminate photographs of her 
consensual sexual activities.37 
Consider further the case of Phillip Alpert, a high school student who, at the age of 
seventeen, had been involved in a two-year-long relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl.38  One 
night, his girlfriend, with whom he shared many intimacies, e-mailed him a nude picture of 
herself.39  The picture depicted neither a sexual act nor an obscene pose, but rather simply 
                                                 
33 Id. at 236. 
34 Id. (noting that A.H. relied on FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (1998)). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 235, 238. 
38 Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside the Prosecution of a Teen 
Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (2009).  The article includes a transcript of the authors’ 
interview with Alpert and his attorney in question-and-answer format. Id. at 10–34. 
39 Id. at 17. 
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showed her standing in front of the camera without clothes on.40  Unfortunately, Phillip’s 
relationship with his girlfriend did not last.  After quarreling one night, Phillip decided to exact 
revenge on his girlfriend.41  He used the password she had previously shared with him to access 
her e-mail account.42  Phillip then retrieved the nude picture his girlfriend had taken of herself 
(and had voluntarily sent to him), and sent it to all of her e-mail contacts, totaling about seventy 
people.43 
Sending his girlfriend’s nude picture to her e-mail contacts without her consent was 
profoundly unwise.  It undoubtedly greatly embarrassed his girlfriend and shocked and surprised 
the recipients.  His actions arguably violated her privacy rights and were actionable as an 
invasion of her privacy, as this Article discusses below.44  While Phillip may deserve some form 
of punishment, the punishment he received does not fit the “crime.”  After his former girlfriend’s 
parents contacted the authorities, Phillip was arrested and threatened with prosecution for 140 
counts of child pornography—one count for each “possession” and another for each distribution 
of the image, applying each of the two counts to the seventy individual recipients.45  Prosecutors 
told him he would spend most of his life in prison if he did not accept a plea.46 
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 8. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See Part VI, infra, which argues that incidents of sexting in which images are shared without the consent of 
the subject are actionable under the public disclosure of private fact prong of the common law invasion of privacy 
tort. 
45 Richards & Calvert, supra note 38, at 19. 
46 Id. at 20. 
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Faced with the devastating possibility of life in prison, Phillip pled guilty to child 
pornography charges.47  He was sentenced to five years probation and is required to register as a 
sex offender wherever he resides until he turns forty-three years old (and perhaps indefinitely).48  
His name and face now appear on posters describing him as guilty of child pornography.49  
Because he was arrested for a felony, his college expelled him and he has been unable to secure 
employment (prospective employers apparently do not want to hire him because of his criminal 
record).50  Furthermore, Phillip can no longer live with his father because his father’s home is 
too close to the high school Phillip attended, and registered sex offenders cannot live in close 
proximity to such schools.51  In short, Phillip’s life was devastated by the consequences of his 
unwise act and by the state’s decision to charge him under child pornography laws. 
Prosecutors throughout the nation have subjected teens who engaged in similar conduct 
to the draconian regime of state child pornography laws.  In April 2009, for example, a fourteen-
year-old New Jersey girl was arrested and charged with possession and distribution of child 
pornography for posting thirty nude pictures of herself on MySpace to share with her 
boyfriend.52  The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children found the photos and 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Federal law requires states to comply with certain mandates regarding offender registration.  The federal Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–16914, required states to amend their laws to 
subject all juveniles over the age of fourteen convicted of applicable child pornography or sex offense charges to the 
mandate under Megan’s Law which requires sex offenders to register for at least ten years and to have their names 
and pictures displayed on the state’s sex offender website. 
49 See Sexual Offender/Predator Flyer, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/flyer.do?personId=60516 (last visited Sept. 9, 2011). 
50 Richards & Calvert, supra note 38, at 9. 
51 Id. at 21. 
52 See Charles Toutant, Legislation Would Decriminalize ‘Sexting’ by Teens, N.J. L.J., July 21, 2009; Passaic 
Teen Faces Child Porn Charges for Posting Nude Pics of Herself on Myspace, NJ.COM (Mar. 26, 2009, 1:35 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/03/passaic_14yearold_arrested_for.html. 
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informed the local sheriff’s department.53  In March 2004, a fifteen-year-old girl was arrested for 
taking nude photographs of herself engaged in various sexual acts and posting them on the 
Internet.54  Prosecutors charged her with sexual abuse of a child, possession of child 
pornography, and dissemination of child pornography.55  In October 2008, a fifteen-year-old girl 
from Newark, Ohio was charged with felony child pornography for texting nude images of 
herself to some of her classmates.56  If convicted, she may have to register as a sex offender for 
the rest of her life.57  In Greensburg, Pennsylvania, three girls aged fourteen to fifteen texted 
nude pictures of themselves to three male classmates aged sixteen to seventeen.58  School 
officials seized one of the male students’ cell phones for using it in violation of the school’s rules 
and discovered the photos.59  The girls were “charged with manufacturing, disseminating, or 
possessing child pornography, while the boys face[d] charges of possession” of child 
pornography.60  In Virginia, two teenage high school students were charged in 2009 with child 
pornography and related charges after they solicited nude and semi-nude pictures of younger 
female students to trade among themselves.61  The list goes on. 
                                                 
53 Girl Posts Nude Pics, Is Charged with Kid Porn, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 27, 2009, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29912729/. 
54 Teen Girl Charged with Posting Nude Photos on Internet, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2004, 6:34 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2004-03-29-child-self-porn_x.htm. 
55 Id. 
56 See Violet Blue, When Teens Make Their Own Porn, Who’s Being Exploited?, SFGATE.COM (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-01-29/living/17331420_1_child-pornography-boys-face-charges-nude-photographs. 
57 Id. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61 Bill Starks, Two Spotsylvania Students Arrested for Child Porn, in Latest ‘Sexting’ Case, 9 NEWS NOW (Mar. 
10, 2009, 6:35 PM), http://www.wusa9.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=82608&catid=188. 
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In short, many teens in several states are engaging in sexting—as many as fifteen to 
twenty percent of teens who have a cell-phone, according to the latest studies.62  Prosecuting 
such conduct under criminal child pornography laws is misguided, unconstitutional, and may 
harm the very people the laws were designed to protect. 
III. Child Pornography Laws and the First Amendment 
Currently enacted child pornography laws, at both the federal and state level, generally 
do not exempt cases of sexting from their reach.  However, an analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
child pornography jurisprudence shows that applying such laws to typical incidents of sexting is 
unconstitutional and inconsistent with the government’s interests underlying such laws. 
Generally, child pornography laws punish the possession, creation, distribution, and 
receipt of visual depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  Such laws typically 
apply across the board to minors and do not exempt minors who are near the age of majority or, 
indeed, over the legal age to consent to sexual relations.63  The term “minor” in child 
pornography laws includes individuals up to age eighteen, although some state laws specify a 
different age range.  In recent years, laws addressing child pornography have become 
increasingly harsh and expansive in their reach, especially at the federal level.64  This Article 
reviews the contours of state and federal child pornography laws and examines the Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in this area, concluding that applying these laws to instances of sexting does 
not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
                                                 
62 See supra text accompanying notes 6–8. 
63 See infra text accompanying notes 66–67. 
64 Indeed, the federal Commission on Pornography (unsuccessfully) recommended increasing the age of 
majority for child pornography laws from eighteen to twenty-one. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON 
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 623–28 (1986). 
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A. The Contours of Federal Child Pornography Laws 
Congress undertook its first effort to outlaw child pornography with the passage of the 
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.65  This Act defines child 
pornography as “any visual depiction . . . of sexually explicit conduct” by a minor66 and defines 
“minor” to include all those under eighteen years of age.67  In response to the increased use of 
personal computers to access sexually explicit content, Congress moved to expand the Act’s 
reach and in 1988 passed amendments to the Act which included criminalizing the transmission 
of child pornography “by any means including by computer.”68 
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), provisions of which Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition struck down,69 revised and extended the behavior prohibited by the Act.  
CPPA made it a crime to transport, distribute, or receive “any visual depiction” that “involves 
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”70  The Act also criminalized the 
possession of computer disks containing three or more images of child pornography.71  CPPA 
extended the federal prohibition of child pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to 
depict minors but were produced without real children, as well as material promoted or pandered 
so as to convey the impression that it involves minors, regardless of whether it actually involves 
                                                 
65 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2259 (2006). 
66 Id. § 2256(8).  Sexually explicit conduct is defined to include:  “actual or simulated (i) sexual intercourse, 
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite 
sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or 
pubic area of any person.” Id. § 2256(2)(B). 
67 Id. § 2256(1). 
68 Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511(b), 102 Stat. 4485, 
4485 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2006)). 
69 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002). 
70 See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
71 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 
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minors.  In 1998, the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act modified the federal 
possession requirement to prohibit possession of a computer disk that contains a single image of 
child pornography (revising the three-image requirement in CPPA).72  After portions of the 
CPPA were struck down in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, Congress went back to the 
drawing board in an attempt to remedy the constitutional defects identified by the Court, and 
passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003 (the PROTECT Act).73  This Act redefined and narrowed the pandering and 
solicitation provisions of CPPA to punish only those who actually believe, or intend others to 
believe, that the subjects of the sexually oriented material at issue are real children.74  The 
Supreme Court upheld these provisions of the PROTECT Act in United States v. Williams.75 
Punishment of child pornography under federal law is subject to severe penalties, 
including a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison for any first offense involving 
trafficking.76  Additionally, those convicted of child pornography are typically required to 
register as sex offenders.77  Federal law provides for severe maximum penalties as well, 
including a maximum punishment of twenty years for a first offense78 and double that amount if 
the defendant has a qualifying prior conviction or if the offense involved hard-core child 
pornography.79  The federal government has aggressively prosecuted child pornography offenses 
                                                 
72 Id. §  2252A(a)(5). 
73 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
74 See id. 
75 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
76 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)–(2). 
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (sex offender registration). 
78 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). 
79 Id. § 2252(b)(2). 
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under these statutes.  For example, over 1,500 defendants faced child pornography and related 
offenses in 2005.80  In 2007, the Justice Department launched Project Safe Childhood and 
cracked down even more heavily on child pornography and related offenses.81 
To the extent that these federal child pornography laws are applied to acts of actual child 
pornography (typically involving possession, creation, or distribution of images of young 
children by older male sexual predators, as well as involving or constituting sexual abuse of 
children), these harsh penalties are appropriate.  As the Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he sexual 
abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent 
people.”82  However, to the extent that such laws are extended to incidents of teen sexting, the 
penalties are disproportionately harsh and unconstitutional as applied.  Federal child 
pornography laws provide no exception for sexually explicit images voluntarily created and 
shared by older teenagers, despite the fact that under federal law the teenagers may legally 
consent to engage in sexual activity.83  Consequently, an individual can legally consent to engage 
in sexual activity, but face severe criminal punishment for depicting such activity.  Protecting 
sexual activity while criminalizing the depiction and communication of depictions of that activity 
leads to an anomalous result and presents First Amendment problems. 
B. State Child Pornography Laws 
The vast majority of states also have child pornography laws that regulate the production, 
distribution, or possession of child pornography.  Like Congress, many state legislatures have 
                                                 
80 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Project Safe Childhood Initiative, (Feb. 15, 
2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/February/06_opa_081.html. 
81 See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Crackdown on Child Pornography, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at A1. 
82 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). 
83 See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (age of consent in the federal maritime and territorial jurisdiction is sixteen). 
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amended their statutes to apply to computer, electronic, or digital images.84  In fashioning their 
child pornography laws, the majority of states (thirty-two) define a child as any person under the 
age of eighteen,85 notwithstanding the fact that the vast majority of such states also fix the age of 
consent to legally engage in sexual activity at sixteen.86  In contrast, three states define child 
under their child pornography laws as anyone under the age of seventeen,87 three other states 
define child as anyone under the age of sixteen,88 others provide variable definitions of minor,89 
and the remaining do not explicitly define the age of a “minor” or “child.”90  Yet, other states, 
                                                 
84 See Karl A. Menninger, II, Cyberporn: Transmission of Images by Computer as Obscene, Harmful to Minors 
or Child Pornography, 61 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 51, 87 (explaining that “state laws prohibiting child 
pornography have phrases or terms clearly including computer-generated images”); see also id. nn.17–24. 
85 These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Nat’l Dist. Attorney’s Ass’n, Nat’l Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse, 
Child Pornography Distribution and Promotion Statutes, available at 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Child%20Pornography%20Distribution%20Statutes%203-2010.pdf (last updated June 
2010). 
86 Thirty-four states set the age of consent—the minimum age at which an individual can legally consent to 
engage in sexual intercourse under any circumstances—at sixteen years of age, while another six set the age of 
consent at seventeen years of age. LEWIN GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATUTORY RAPE: A 
GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 5 (2004), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/SR/StateLaws/report.pdf. 
87 These states are Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Child Pornography Distribution and Promotion Statutes, 
supra note 85, at 6, 10, 63. 
88 These states are Connecticut, Montana, and Vermont. Id. at 23–24, 89–90, 139. 
89 These states are Delaware, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. Id. 
90 Other state codes provide different definitions of minor for different sections.  Maryland’s code does not 
define the term minor in § 11-207 (child pornography) but § 11-208 (possession of visual representation of child 
under 16 engaged in certain sexual acts) defines minor as anyone under sixteen. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 11-
207, 11-208 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).  It is unclear whether this definition is intended to apply to the section 
preceding it.  Missouri defines a child as anyone under fourteen, but child pornography includes “[a]ny obscene 
material or performance depicting sexual conduct, sexual contact, or a sexual performance, as these terms are 
defined in section 556.061, RSMo, and which has as one of its participants or portrays as an observer of such 
conduct, contact, or performance a minor under the age of eighteen.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 573.010(2)(a) (West 2011).  
In Nevada, minor is not explicitly defined either, but the punishments vary based on the age of the child involved in 
the pornography. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.750 (LexisNexis 2006) (“A person punishable pursuant to NRS 
200.710 or 200.720 shall be punished for a category A felony by imprisonment in the state prison:  1.  If the minor is 
14 years of age or older, for life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum 
of 5 years has been served, and shall be further punished by a fine of not more than $100,000.  2.  If the minor is less 
than 14 years of age, for life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 
10 years has been served, and shall be further punished by a fine of not more than $100,000.”).  New Jersey’s 
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while defining “minor” broadly as anyone under eighteen, provide for enhanced punishment if 
the minor involved is below a certain age.91  Some states provide for an affirmative defense if the 
defendant is not much older than the minor involved,92 while other states enhance penalties 
where the adult is significantly older than the minor involved.93  In contrast, some states’ child 
pornography laws provide for varying penalties that depend on the age of the minor involved.94  
State laws also vary in terms of their reach, with some, like Pennsylvania, extending broadly to 
depictions of “nudity . . . depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any 
person who might view such depiction,”95 while other states provide for narrower definitions of 
prohibited expression.96 
As applied to instances of sexting, the vast majority of state laws—like comparable 
federal laws—provide no exceptions for sexually explicit images that are voluntarily created and 
shared by teens, despite the fact that under these state laws, some teens are old enough to legally 
consent to engage in sexual activity.  As under the federal law, this means that an individual can 
                                                                                                                                                             
statutes are similarly ambiguous, with some sections defining a minor as anyone under eighteen and other sections 
defining a minor as anyone under sixteen.  In New York, some provisions apply to minors under sixteen, others 
apply to minors under seventeen. 
91 For example, in Texas, sexual conduct with a minor under eighteen is a second degree felony.  If the minor is 
under fourteen, the felony becomes a first degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25(c) (West 2011).  Virginia 
also defines a minor as anyone under the age of eighteen, but also enhances penalties where the minor is less than 
fifteen. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1(C1) & (C2) (2009). 
92 For example, Texas allows an affirmative defense if the defendant is not more than two years older than the 
minor involved. TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.25(f)(3). 
93 Virginia, for example, enhances penalties where the adult is more than seven years older than the minor 
involved. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1(C1) & (C2) (2009). 
94 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.320(2)(a) & (2)(b) (LexisNexis 2008) (“Promoting a sexual 
performance by a minor is:  (a) A Class C felony if the minor involved in the sexual performance is less than 
eighteen (18) years old at the time the minor engages in the prohibited activity; (b) A Class B felony if the minor 
involved in the sexual performance is less than sixteen (16) years old at the time the minor engages in the prohibited 
activity.”). 
95 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312 (2009). 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 90–94. 
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legally consent to engage in sexual activity, yet face severe criminal punishment for creating, 
possessing, or sharing an image of herself engaged in such activity.  Once again, this presents 
serious First Amendment problems. 
To make matters worse, some states have recently specifically amended their child 
pornography and related laws to expressly cover instances of sexting.  Lawmakers in eleven 
states introduced legislation in 2009 aimed at deterring teens from sexting.97  Colorado, for 
example, added “text messages” to the definition of the means to commit “computer 
dissemination of indecent material to a child”98 so as to encompass sexting within the reach of 
this law.  Following this trend, Utah recently enacted legislation providing for penalties for 
minors who distribute pornographic material or who deal in material harmful to a minor.99  In 
summary, sexting appears to be within the reach of most state child pornography laws, and some 
states are expressly revising their laws to make clear that they encompass acts of sexting. 
C. Child Pornography Jurisprudence 
First Amendment law regarding child pornography has evolved along a somewhat 
separate course than the law governing obscenity generally.  While both areas involve sexually 
themed works, the Supreme Court has articulated a separate jurisprudence governing the 
                                                 
97 See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2009 “Sexting” Legislation, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17756 (last updated Sept. 1, 2010). 
98 See  COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-1002(1) (2011) (defining computer dissemination of indecent material to a 
child as “[a] person commits computer dissemination of indecent material to a child when:  (a) Knowing the 
character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, or sexual 
conduct, as defined in section 19-1-103(97), C.R.S., the person willfully uses a computer, computer network, 
telephone network, data network, or computer system allowing the input, output, examination, or transfer of 
computer data or computer programs from one computer to another or a text-messaging or instant-messaging system 
to initiate or engage in such communication with a person he or she believes to be a child; and (b) By means of such 
communication the person importunes, invites, entices, or induces a person he or she believes to be a child to engage 
in sexual contact, sexual intrusion, or sexual penetration with the person, or to engage in a sexual performance or 
sexual conduct, as defined in section 19-1-103(97), C.R.S., for the person’s benefit.”). 
99 See H.B. 14, 2009 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009). 
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regulation of sexually themed works with minors as subjects, which constitutes a “related and 
overlapping category of proscribable speech.”100 
The law of obscentiy governs sexually themed works involving subjects of all ages—
adults and minors.  Indeed, although incidents of sexting have been the subject of child 
pornography prosecutions, such images might also constitute obscene works under federal or 
state law.  For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court struggled to articulate a 
coherent and workable set of guidelines for distinguishing protected sexually themed expression 
protected by the First Amendment from sexually theme expression that constitutes obscenity.  
Ultimately, in Miller v. California, the Supreme Court fashioned a set of guidelines for the 
regulation of sexually themed works.101  The three-prong Miller test requires a consideration of:  
(1) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that 
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.102 
The Miller test provides important safeguards for sexually themed speech.  Miller first 
makes clear that obscenity is determined using a local, community standard.103  Specifically, the 
applicable standard is that of the average member of the community, applying contemporary 
community standards to assess whether the expression at issue, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
                                                 
100 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008). 
101 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  These guidelines remain the current standard. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 
153, 157 (1974); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987). 
102 Id. 
103 Miller, 413 U.S. at 30–32. 
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prurient interest.104  Second, Miller requires that, to regulate obscene content, a regulator 
(whether the federal, state, or local government) must specifically define which descriptions or 
depictions of specific sexual acts may be deemed patently offensive under contemporary 
community standards.105  This requirement reduces the potential for vagueness within obscenity 
statutes.106  Determining whether a work is patently offensive, like determining whether a work 
appeals to the prurient interest, is judged under the standard of the average member of the local 
community.107  The third prong of Miller provides that judges retain the power to determine 
whether sexually themed speech has redeeming serious social value (i.e., literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value) and, therefore, whether such speech is protected by the First 
Amendment regardless of its assessment by local communities.108  Because this determination is 
ultimately to be made by courts and not jury members, this “savings clause” provides a judicial 
check on local communities’ power to determine what sexually themed expression is unprotected 
by the First Amendment.  As the Supreme Court has explained, “the serious value requirement 
‘allows appellate courts to impose some limitations and regularity on the definition [of 
obscenity] by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor for socially redeeming value.’”109 
                                                 
104 Id. at 30–31. 
105 See id. at 24–25. 
106 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997). 
107 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 576 n.7 (2002) (“[T]he ‘patently offensive’ prong of the test is also a 
question of fact to be decided by a jury applying contemporary community standards.”). 
108 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (reversing jury verdict where film in question was not 
patently offensive under the Miller standard). 
109 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 579 (emphasis in original).  Thus, even if a less “tolerant” community 
made the determination that a certain edition of The Joy of Sex was obscene and unprotected by the First 
Amendment, Miller requires that such determinations be second-guessed by the judicial branch, which has the 
responsibility for applying this Miller savings clause to declare that the expression at issue nonetheless has serious 
redeeming social value and is therefore protected by the First Amendment.  Accordingly, despite the fact that a local 
jury in Georgia, applying its state obscenity statute, determined that the Academy Award-winning film Carnal 
Knowledge appealed to the prurient interest and described sexually conduct in a patently offensive manner, the court 
in that case enjoyed and exercised the power to determine that the work nonetheless enjoyed serious literary value.  
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A decade after it set forth the Miller standard governing obscene works generally, the 
Supreme Court articulated a separate test for sexually themed works depicting minors, which are 
afforded less First Amendment protection.  For works involving child pornography, New York v. 
Ferber fashioned a separate test that did not include the speech-protective elements of the Miller 
test.110  Since its Ferber decision in 1982, the Court has continued to advance this separate but 
related jurisprudence for sexually themed works involving minors, in cases such as Osborne v. 
Ohio,111 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,112 and recently in United States v. Williams.113 
In Ferber, the Supreme Court made clear that First Amendment protection for sexually 
themed works depicting minors is not governed by the same test as obscene works generally. 114  
Ferber involved the constitutionality of a New York statute that criminalized the promotion of a 
“sexual performance by a child.”115  The statute defined “child” as anyone fifteen years of age or 
younger,116 and included a detailed and specific definition of “sexual performance.”117  Paul 
Ferber was the proprietor of a Manhattan bookstore specializing in sexually themed works and 
sold two films to an undercover police officer that depicted young boys masturbating.118  Ferber 
                                                                                                                                                             
The court was therefore able to rescue the film from the jury’s classification of it as obscene and unprotected by the 
First Amendment. See Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 153. 
110 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
111 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
112 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
113 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
114 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. 
115 Id. at 750 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263 (McKinney 1980)). 
116 Id. at 751 (The statute defined sexual performance as “any performance or part thereof which includes sexual 
conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.”) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(1)). 
117 Id. (The statute defined sexual conduct to include “actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual 
intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.”) (quoting 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3)). 
118 Id. at 751–52. 
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challenged the constitutionality of the New York statute, claiming that the works in question 
were governed by the Miller obscenity standard, and that the state had no power to criminalize 
depictions of sexual conduct involving minors that were not legally obscene under Miller.119  
The Supreme Court disagreed. 
First, the Court rejected Ferber’s argument that sexual works involving children can only 
be banned if the works are obscene under the Miller standard.120  Because the “prevention of 
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing 
importance,” the state’s interest in preventing these harms is distinct from the state’s interest in 
preventing offense from viewing obscene material that the Court credited in Miller.121  The 
Court observed that the Miller standard, which recognizes the state’s interest in protecting the 
“sensibilities of unwilling recipients” from offense brought about by exposure to pornographic 
materials, “does not reflect the state’s particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting 
those who promote the sexual exploitation of children.”122  While Miller primarily concerns 
offenses based on unwilling exposure to sexually themed expression generally, the state’s 
interest in regulating child pornography primarily centers around drying up the market for child 
pornography and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse of children, by punishing those who 
commercially promote material that involves the sexual exploitation of children—which is itself 
a crime.  To remove the economic incentive for commercial exploitation of such works and to 
protect children from sexual exploitation, the Supreme Court recognized that states must be 
                                                 
119 Id. at 760–61. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 757. 
122 Id. at 761 (emphasis added). 
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permitted to regulate materials that involve actual sexual exploitation of children under a 
standard different than that articulated in Miller. 
Under the standard articulated in Ferber, states may prohibit the promotion of sexual 
conduct involving a minor in order to dry up the market for the sexual exploitation and abuse of 
children if (1) such conduct is specifically and narrowly defined by the applicable state law, and 
(2) the work visually depicts sexual conduct by children at or below a specified age (which, in 
the case of the New York statute, was fifteen years of age).123  The Court was careful to 
emphasize, however, that depictions of nudity, without more, could not be constitutionally 
prohibited.124 
Yet, because the state’s interest in drying up the material for the sexual exploitation of 
children is stronger than its interest in protecting adults from being offended by unwilling 
exposure to obscene works, the safeguards applicable to sexually themed works depicting adults 
generally do not extend to sexually themed works depicting minors.  First, to be proscribable 
under Ferber, the work need not be “taken as a whole,” nor must the work “appeal to the prurient 
interest of the average person” or be “patently offensive.”125  Furthermore, under Ferber’s test, it 
is apparently irrelevant whether the material has “serious literary, artistic, political or social 
value”126 when determining whether a work is illegal child pornography.  The Court has further 
distinguished child pornography from obscenity in its decisions regarding private possession.  
While adults enjoy the right to possess even obscene works in the privacy of their own homes 
                                                 
123 Id. at 764. 
124 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112–14 (1990) (citing Ferber for the proposition that “depictions of nudity, 
without more, constitute [First Amendment] protected expression” and holding that the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
limiting construction of the state statute at issue in that case “avoided penalizing persons for viewing or possessing 
innocuous photographs of naked children”). 
125 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. 
126 Id. 
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under Stanley v. Georgia,127 the Court made clear in Osborne v. Ohio that private possession of 
child pornography is not similarly protected.128  Because the state has a compelling interest in 
“stamp[ing] out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain” and because such images, even if 
privately possessed, “permanently record the victim’s abuse,” the private possession of child 
pornography is not constitutionally protected.129 
The Supreme Court further articulated its child pornography jurisprudence in evaluating 
the constitutionality of the federal Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA).130  This 
Act extended the federal prohibition against child pornography to sexually explicit images that 
appear to depict minors but that were produced without actual minors and to material that was 
promoted so as to convey the impression that it involved minors, even if it actually did not.131  
Extending the definition of child pornography to sexually explicit depictions that appear to be of 
a minor, the CPPA intended to capture a range of depictions involving “virtual” child 
pornography that include computer-generated images of minors, as well as images of actual 
youthful-looking adults engaging in sexually explicit conduct.  Second, the CPPA extended the 
definition of child pornography to computer-modified images of real children that are made to 
appear as if the children are engaged in sexual activity, even though no minors were actually 
engaged in sexual activity.132  Third, the CPPA extended the definition of child pornography to 
                                                 
127 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the “mere private possession of obscene 
material” is not a crime). 
128 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (holding that “Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of 
child pornography”). 
129 Id. at 110–11. 
130 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260A. 
131 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2006). 
132 See id. § 2256(8)(C) (covering material that has been “created, adapted, or modified to appear that an 
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct”). 
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include any sexually explicit image that is “advertised, promoted, presented, described, or 
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression” that it depicts a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.133  This provision was intended to encompass sexually explicit images 
that are intentionally “pandered as” child pornography,134 regardless of whether any actual 
children were depicted in such images.  The Act defined minor as anyone under the age of 
eighteen,135 an age that is above the legal age for marriage in virtually every state and above the 
age at which persons may consent to sexual relations in most states.136  CPPA also provided for 
severe penalties for violations of these provisions, including prison terms of up to fifteen years 
for first-time offenders and up to thirty years for repeat offenders.137  The Free Speech Coalition, 
a trade association for the adult entertainment industry and artists specializing in nude and erotic 
images, challenged several of the definitional changes enacted by the CPPA.138  The challengers 
asserted that because the statute banned images that do not involve actual children engaging in 
sexual performances, it swept too broadly and infringed their First Amendment rights.139  The 
Supreme Court agreed. 
                                                 
133 Id. § 2256(8)(D). 
134 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002). 
135 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1). 
136 See id. § 2243(a) (age of consent in the federal maritime and territorial jurisdiction is sixteen); WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 1021–22 (1997) (listing the age of consent 
for engaging in sexual activity in each state, which shows the age is sixteen or younger in thirty-nine states and the 
District of Columbia); NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 384–88 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 3d ed. 1999) (stating 
forty-eight states permit sixteen-year-olds to marry with parental consent). 
137 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (Supp. II 1997).  The current statute provides similarly harsh penalties. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1)–(3) (2006) (providing up to fifteen years for first-time offenders and up to forty years for 
repeat offenders). 
138 Because the second extension, involving morphed images, applied to images of actual children, whose 
interests were implicated by the morphing of their images to make it appear that they were engaged in sexual acts, 
this extension was not challenged by the plaintiffs in this case. 
139 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 243. 
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The Court in Free Speech Coalition reviewed and clarified its holding in Ferber by 
explaining that Ferber stood for the proposition that the distribution, sale, and production of 
child pornography could be banned because such acts “were ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual 
abuse of children in two ways.”140  Because the commercial trafficking in child pornography was 
an economic motive for its production, “the most expeditious . . . method of law enforcement 
may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons 
selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.”141  Further, the Ferber Court held that 
because pornographic material depicting actual children constituted a permanent record of the 
child’s abuse, the continued circulation of the material would harm the child who participated.142  
The Court explained that under either of these rationales, the images had a “proximate link to the 
crime from which it came”143 and went on to hold that “the creation of the speech is itself the 
crime of child abuse.”144  In contrast, the Court stated that the first provision of the CPPA 
challenged by Free Speech Coalition, which prohibited the creation of sexually explicit images 
using youthful-looking adults or computer-generated images of (imaginary) minors, restricted 
“speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production.”145  The Court therefore 
emphasized that the state’s interest in regulating child pornography is primarily one of drying up 
the market for depictions of child sexual abuse involving actual children—activity that involves 
an actual crime.146 
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The Court next examined the provision of the statute prohibiting sexually explicit 
materials that “convey the impression” of depicting minors if the material was promoted or 
pandered” in such a way as to suggest that it involved actual minors,147 even if it did not. Under 
this provision, it is irrelevant whether the sexually explicit images actually depict any minors.  
Even if a work contains no sexually explicit scenes involving minors, it could still constitute 
child pornography that could be banned if the promotion of the work conveys the impression that 
it involves actual minors.148  In evaluating this provision, the Court acknowledged that its prior 
precedent recognized that the “pandering” or commercial exploitation of a work factors in the 
issue of whether the work constituted illegal obscenity.149  In Ginzburg v. United States, for 
example, the Court explained that “in close cases, evidence of pandering may be probative with 
respect to the nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the [obscenity] test.”150  
However, the Court in Free Speech Coalition emphasized that the challenged prong of CPPA 
impermissibly went beyond Ginzburg’s pandering rationale to criminalize works even absent a 
context of “commercial exploitation.”151  The majority reasoned that this provision of CPPA 
went far beyond prohibiting commercial exploitation because it classified materials falling 
within this provision as “tainted and unlawful in the hands of all who receive it” simply because 
the materials were “described or pandered as child pornography by someone earlier in the 
distribution chain.”152  Possession of such material would constitute a crime, even if the material 
contained no sexual performance by a minor, so long as someone earlier in the distribution chain 
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had promoted the material as containing such a sexual performance.  This provision had the 
effect of criminally prohibiting the mere possession of sexual explicit materials, regardless of 
whether they contain sexual performances by a minor.  As a result, the Court had little difficulty 
in finding this provision unconstitutional. 
Taken together, Ferber and Free Speech Coalition make clear that the state has a 
compelling interest in preventing the sexual abuse of children and that this interest may 
constitutionally be advanced by targeting those who engage in the commercial exploitation of 
images involving actual sexual abuse of children or that otherwise have a “proximate link” to the 
crime of sexual exploitation or abuse of children.153  The Court emphasized the interest of 
prosecuting those who commercially promote or are otherwise involved in the sexual 
exploitation and abuse of children as well as drying up the market for such exploitation and 
abuse.154  Importantly, the Court also made clear that where the content in question is not a 
product of sexual abuse or proximately linked to the sexual abuse and exploitation of children 
(nor legally obscene under Miller), such content enjoys full First Amendment protection.155 
After the Court struck down provisions of the CPPA, Congress went back to the drawing 
board and attempted to remedy the constitutional defects identified by the Court—in particular, 
in CPPA’s pandering provision.  The result was the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to 
end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (the PROTECT Act), which set forth a 
revised “pandering and solicitation” provision.156  In United States v. Williams, Michael 
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Williams challenged his conviction for pandering under this provision of the Act, codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A.157  The Court rejected his challenge and upheld the provision. 
The Court first acknowledged that this section, which prohibits offers to provide and 
requests to obtain child pornography, does not require the actual existence of child 
pornography.158  Rather, it “bans the collateral speech that introduces such material into the 
child-pornography distribution network,”159 which is typically (but not exclusively) a 
commercial market.  Although this section does not require the actual existence of child 
pornography, the Court nonetheless held that speech falling within the scope of § 2252A could 
be banned on the ground that “offers to engage in illegal transactions,” like the exchange of child 
pornography, “are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”160  Because an 
offer to provide or a request to receive child pornography is in fact an offer to engage in an 
illegal transaction, this collateral speech could be banned so long as the speaker believes, or 
intends the listener to believe, that the subject of the proposed transaction involves real 
children.161 
Several important lessons for the current controversies surrounding sexting may be drawn 
from the Supreme Court’s child pornography jurisprudence.  First, the Court has focused 
                                                                                                                                                             
promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits . . . any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, 
or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or contains” a visual 
depiction of actual minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct.  The Act also provides an appropriately detailed 
and narrow definition of “sexually explicit conduct,” which includes “actual or simulated—(i) sexual intercourse, 
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite 
sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or 
pubic area of any person.” See id. § 502(b), 117 Stat. at 678–79 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)). 
157 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008). 
158 Id. at 293. 
159 Id. at 288. 
160 Id. at 297. 
161 Id. at 293. 
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primarily on the harm that arises from transactions in content integral to the crimes of sexual 
exploitation and abuse of children.  Second, the Court has focused on the commercial or 
transactional nature of the conduct at issue.  In the child pornography context, the Court has 
recognized in particular the government interest in drying up the commercial. or transactional,162 
market for child pornography.  This emphasis on the market for child pornography echoes the 
Court’s emphasis in the obscenity context, in which the Court has made clear that criminal 
prohibitions on noncommercial sexually themed speech are unconstitutional.163  Third, the Court 
has explained that depictions of nudity alone—even those involving minors—cannot form the 
sole basis of a child pornography prosecution.  Fourth, the Court has been critical of attempts to 
criminalize the mere depiction of teens engaged in sexual activity—especially when those 
depicted are at or near the age at which they can legally consent to have sex.  The Court has been 
critical of attempts to increase the statutory age of “child” for precisely this reason.  In criticizing 
CPPA’s extension of the definition of minor to include all those who are or appear to be 
seventeen years of age or younger, the Supreme Court explained that “the statute proscribes the 
visual depiction of an idea—that of teenagers engaging in sexual activity—that is a fact of 
modern society and has been a theme in art and literature throughout the ages.”164  The Court 
observed that the age established by the CPPA was higher than the legal age at which persons 
                                                 
162 As the Court explained in Williams, 
To be clear, our conclusion that all the words in this list relate to transactions is not to say that they 
relate to commercial transactions.  One could certainly ‘distribute’ child pornography without 
expecting payment in return.  Indeed, in much Internet file sharing of child pornography each 
participant makes his files available for free to other participants—as Williams did in this case 
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553 U.S. 285, 295 (2008). 
163 See the discussion of ACLU v. Reno, infra, and the comparison between the CDA’s provisions and the 
statute at issue in the Ginsberg case. 
164 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002). 
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could legally consent to sexual relations, leading to the anomalous result in which an individual 
could consent to sexual relations yet be criminally prosecuted under CPPA for depicting such 
sexual relations. 
D. The Constitutionality of Prosecuting Sexting as Child Pornography 
A review of the Supreme Court’s child pornography jurisprudence makes clear that 
sexting prosecutions like those described in Part II above cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.  First, typical acts of sexting do not depict sexual abuse or exploitation of children—the 
gravamen of legitimate child pornography claims.  The state’s interest in prosecuting acts of 
sexting is not the same as the interest recognized by the Supreme Court of drying up the market 
for content that constitutes a “proximate link to the crime”165 of sexual exploitation or abuse of 
children.  Second, acts of sexting typically occur in a noncommercial context, not in commercial 
or transactional contexts.  Third, many incidents of sexting—like the Pennsylvania and Florida 
cases discussed above—involve mere depictions of nudity or partial nudity, which the Court has 
held are insufficient to constitute child pornography.  Fourth, several instances of sexting, like in 
Phillip Alpert,166 A.H., and J.G.W.,167 involve minors at or near the age of consent, which the 
Court has made clear are particularly problematic. 
In addition, the Supreme Court has made clear that minors enjoy First Amendment rights 
to access and disseminate sexually themed expression of the kind typically involved in sexting 
communications.  Although minors’ First Amendment rights are not as extensive as those 
enjoyed by adults, they are extensive enough to protect the creation and dissemination of semi-
nude and nude pictures of oneself that are not child pornography or obscene-for-minors (under 
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properly limited definitions of both terms).  Indeed, the act of creating a photograph of oneself, 
like creating a self-portrait or writing in a diary, is an essential component of an individual’s self-
expression, the furtherance of which is an essential function of the First Amendment.  The next 
Part contends that prosecutions of minors for creating and sharing such images violate the First 
Amendment rights of the minors who are involved. 
IV. The First Amendment Rights of Minors 
Although minors’ First Amendment rights are not as extensive as those enjoyed by 
adults, the Supreme Court has made it clear that minors enjoy meaningful rights to freedom of 
expression in general.  As the Court explained in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection and 
only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar 
public dissemination of protected materials to them. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . In most circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no 
less applicable when government seeks to control the flow of information to 
minors.168 
The Court has also held that minors enjoy meaningful rights to access sexually themed 
content.  This Part first examines the philosophical underpinnings of free speech rights in general 
and then considers these foundations as applied to minors in particular.  It outlines the general 
contours of minors’ First Amendment rights and examines these rights in the context of sexually 
themed content. 
In considering the contours of minors’ free speech rights, it is helpful to return to the 
philosophical underpinnings and justifications for free speech rights in general and to consider 
how these are translated in the context of minors’ interests in free expression.  Among the most 
important justifications for protecting freedom of expression is the integral role this protection 
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plays in self-exploration, self-expression, and self-definition.  Although the Court frequently 
refers to the importance of free speech in establishing the preconditions for democratic self-
government and in advancing the free and open marketplace of ideas,169 it has also made clear 
that “the individual’s interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate 
from the concern for open and informed discussion.”170  As David Richards explains, the First 
Amendment “rests not only on [the] value of creating an informed electorate, but also rests on 
the deeper moral premises regarding the general exercise of autonomous expressive and 
judgmental capacity and the good that this affords in human life.”171  Similarly, in the words of 
pre-eminent First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson, individual self-fulfillment depends 
upon the development of an individual’s capacity for reasoning and emotions, self-exploration, 
self-expression, and self-definition in order to form “an integral part of the development of ideas, 
of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self.”172  This justification presupposes that adults 
are engaged in the active process of self-definition and re-definition, which is facilitated through 
their enjoyment of First Amendment freedoms.  Yet minors, if anything, are even more deeply 
entrenched in the process of self-exploration and self-definition.  Consistent with this 
justification for First Amendment freedoms, it is important to protect minors’ right to express 
themselves and to access the expression of others, so as to facilitate their process of self-
exploration, self-expression, and self-definition. 
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The Supreme Court expounded upon the self-expression justification for First 
Amendment freedoms in Procunier v. Martinez, in which the Court struck down restrictions on 
the ability of prisoners to communicate with the outside world.173  Although prisoners (like 
minors) enjoy free speech rights that are not as robust as those enjoyed by free adults, the Court 
emphasized the important role the First Amendment serves in advancing individual self-
expression: 
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also 
those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.  Such expression 
is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity.  To 
suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront 
the individual’s worth and dignity.  Such restraint may be “the greatest 
displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him.” 
. . .  It is the role of the First Amendment and this Court to protect those precious 
personal rights by which we satisfy such basic yearnings of the human spirit.174 
Indeed, in expounding on the importance of self-expression to our First Amendment freedoms, 
the Court expressly incorporated the right to access sexually themed expression in the privacy of 
one’s home, which the Court held is protected in the case Stanley v. Georgia.175  Accordingly, 
the Court has contemplated that the First Amendment’s protections for self-exploration and self-
expression incorporate the right to access sexually themed expression. 
The Court has also emphasized other important values served by the First Amendment, 
including access to a wide range of ideas and information that apply not only to adults but also to 
minors.  As the Court held in the famous Pico case, in which it restricted a school board’s 
discretion to remove books from school libraries: 
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Our precedents have focused not only on the role of the First Amendment in 
fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the public 
access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas. . . .   
. . . . 
. . . [S]tudents must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to 
gain new maturity and understanding.176 
Similarly, in striking down a public school’s decision to suspend minors for wearing black 
armbands to protest the Vietnam War, the Court explained that: 
In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate 
their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression . . . . 
. . . . 
. . .  The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through a wide exposure to 
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, 
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.177 
In sum, the First Amendment justification of facilitating individuals’ self-expression, self-
exploration, and self-definition is of pre-eminent importance, especially as applied to minors, 
who are entrenched in this self-evolutionary process. 
First Amendment protections also facilitate the goals of democratic self-government.178  
Although this justification applies directly only to individuals who have reached the age of 
majority and are formally capable of voting and engaging in the task of self-government, it 
applies indirectly to minors as well.  During youth, individuals are and should be engaged in the 
process of acquiring the tools they need to engage in self-government when they do reach the age 
of majority.  Older minors especially must be accorded broad access to a wide variety of content 
to develop these tools.  Striking down efforts to restrict minors’ access to violent video game 
content, Judge Richard Posner explains in American Amusement Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick: 
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Now that eighteen-year-olds have the right to vote, it is obvious that they must be 
allowed the freedom to form their political views on the basis of uncensored 
speech before they turn eighteen, so that their minds are not a blank when they 
first exercise the franchise. . . .  People are unlikely to become well-functioning, 
independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if they are raised in an 
intellectual bubble.179 
Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected the state’s effort to compel students to pledge allegiance to 
the flag in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, explaining that “educating the 
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the 
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”180  Protecting minors’ freedom of 
expression is necessary to allow them to experience and experiment with the freedoms necessary 
to exercise meaningful rights of self-government.  The closer an individual is to the age of 
majority, the more extensive are her free speech rights.  Adolescence marks a transitional period 
in which individuals should enjoy and experience many of the freedoms that they will come to 
enjoy fully in adulthood so that they will be better able to meaningfully enjoy those freedoms 
when they come of age.  Our system of free expression should ensure that adolescents are able to 
inform themselves and contribute to the public discourse even though they cannot yet participate 
in public elections.  As the Supreme Court emphasized in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the 
University of New York, “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to [the] robust exchange” of ideas and information.181 
The Supreme Court has also made clear that older minors enjoy a First Amendment right 
to engage in and access sexually themed expression, so long as such expression is not obscene, 
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“obscene-for-minors,” or child pornography.  Although minors’ First Amendment rights 
regarding sexually explicit materials are more limited than adults’ rights, they are nonetheless 
substantial. 
Reno v. ACLU is instructive in articulating the contours of minors’ First Amendment 
rights regarding sexually themed expression.182  The Supreme Court struck down the 
Communications Decency Act’s (CDA) criminal prohibitions on the transmission of indecent 
messages to minors183 and on the display of patently offensive messages to minors.184  The fact 
that both of these prohibitions were limited by affirmative defenses made available for those who 
undertook good faith actions to restrict minors’ access to the prohibited communications did not 
save the provisions.185  In evaluating the constitutionality of these prohibitions, the Supreme 
Court first compared them to the restrictions at issue in Ginsberg v. New York, in which the 
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Court first recognized a category of obscene-for-minors speech that could be regulated under a 
different standard than obscene speech (for adults).186 
The Reno Court explained that because the CDA’s restrictions did not embody similar 
safeguards to those in the New York statute, it unconstitutionally infringed on minors’ (and 
adults’) free speech rights.187  In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute that 
regulated minors’ access to content that fell within the statute’s definition of “obscene for 
minors.”188  The state statute primarily aimed to restrict the sale of “girlie” magazines to minors.  
It prohibited the sale of materials considered obscene for minors (although not necessarily 
obscene for adults) to individuals age sixteen and under.189  In accordance with the Supreme 
Court cases that require regulation of obscene speech to include a savings clause,190 the New 
York statute exempted from regulation material that has redeeming social importance to minors.  
Upholding the statute against constitutional challenge, the Court emphasized the fact that the 
statute’s operation did not usurp parental autonomy to determine what material was suitable for 
their children in that the statute allowed “parents who so desire [to] purchas[e] the magazines for 
their children.”191 
Ginsberg therefore stands for the principle that minors’ speech can be regulated under a 
different standard than that applicable to adults’ speech, so long as the relevant regulation 
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adheres to certain safeguards.  These safeguards include the definitional safeguards set forth in 
Miller192 tailored to apply to minors, including a savings clause for speech that has redeeming 
social importance for minors and a patently offensive and prurient interest analysis undertaken in 
light of contemporary community standards.  Requiring a savings clause in this context makes 
clear that any such regulation must preserve minors’ access to expression that has serious 
literary, artistic, scientific, or political value.193 
In Reno, the Court compared the indecent transmission and patently offensive display 
provisions of the CDA to those provisions at issue in Ginsberg and found that the CDA’s 
provisions were constitutionally infirm.194  First, the Court held that the CDA was infirm because 
it defined “minor” as everyone under eighteen, where the New York statute defined “minor” as 
everyone under seventeen.195  Because the CDA reduced the First Amendment rights of those 
nearest to the age of majority, it did not meet constitutional muster.196  The Court’s analysis on 
this point suggests that seventeen-year-old minors’ First Amendment rights must be construed as 
extensively as adults’ First Amendment rights, including their right to engage in and access 
sexually themed expression.  Second, while the New York statute was appropriately tailored in 
line with Miller by limiting its definition of “material that is harmful to minors” with the 
requirement that it be “without redeeming social importance for minors,” the CDA failed to 
provide any definition of the term “indecent.”  The CDA also omitted any requirement that the 
“patently offensive” material covered by § 223(d) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or 
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scientific value.197  The Court explained that “[t]his ‘societal value’ requirement, absent in the 
CDA, allows appellate courts to impose some limitations and regularity on the definition by 
setting, as a matter of law, a national floor for socially redeeming value.”198  Third, while in 
Ginsberg, the statute’s prohibition against sales to minors did not bar parents from purchasing 
the magazines for their children, under the CDA, “neither the parents’ consent—nor even their 
participation—in the communication would avoid the application of the statute.”199  Refusing to 
account for parental discretion on this score disregards the Supreme Court’s “consistent 
recognition of the principle that ‘the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct 
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.’”200  Finally, the New York 
statute at issue in Ginsberg applied only to commercial transactions, whereas the CDA contained 
no such limitation.201 
An analysis of Ginsberg and Reno, together with the Supreme Court’s child pornography 
jurisprudence, indicate that minors enjoy a First Amendment right to communicate and access 
content that is not proximately linked to actual child abuse or exploitation.  This right to 
communicate encompasses the noncommercial communication of sexually themed material that 
has societal value for minors and is not obscene for minors.  And any attempt by the state to 
regulate minors’ communication of sexually themed content must take care to preserve parents’ 
authority in their own households to make determinations as to which sexually themed content 
their children will have the right to access and exchange. 
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V. Proposed Revisions to Child Pornography Laws to Exempt Sexting 
State and federal child pornography laws do not sufficiently protect minors’ free speech 
rights.  Such laws cannot constitutionally be applied to minors engaged in incidents of sexting.  
These laws should be revised to specifically exempt sexting engaged in by consenting teens, as 
described in Part I.  Non-obscene depictions of nudity or sexual activity created by teens and 
exchanged voluntarily for noncommercial purposes should be specifically excluded from the 
definition of child pornography or related crimes.  Child pornography and related laws should be 
amended to exempt sexually themed images that are voluntarily and consensually produced and 
made available by teens in a noncommercial context. 
The state of Vermont has taken precisely such an approach and should serve as a model 
to other states and the federal government.  The Vermont legislature recently amended its Sex 
Trafficking of Children statute to specifically exclude application to persons eighteen and 
younger, where the minor photographed is “at least 13 years old, and the child knowingly and 
voluntarily and without threat or coercion use[s] an electronic communication device to transmit 
an image of himself or herself to another person.”202  This legislation allows prosecutors to send 
teenage “sexting” cases to juvenile courts to eliminate the stigma that accompanies child 
                                                 
202 See 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 58 (Vt. 2009) (“No person shall knowingly:  (1) recruit, entice, harbor, 
transport, provide, or obtain by any means a person under the age of 18 for the purpose of having the person engage 
in a commercial sex act; (2) compel a person through force, fraud, or coercion to engage in a commercial sex act; or 
(3) benefit financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture, knowing that force, fraud, or 
coercion was or will be used to compel any person to engage in a commercial sex act as part of the venture.”) (to be 
codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2635a(b)); (“This section shall not apply if the person is less than 19 years old, 
the child is at least 13 years old, and the child knowingly and voluntarily and without threat or coercion used an 
electronic communication device to transmit an image of himself or herself to the person. . . .”) (to be codified at 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2822(c)); (“This section shall not apply if the person is less than 19 years old, the child is 
at least 13 years old, and the child knowingly and voluntarily and without threat or coercion used an electronic 
communication device to transmit an image of himself or herself to the person.”) (to be codified at VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 2824(c)); (“This section shall not apply if the person is less than 19 years old, the child is at least 13 years 
old, and the child knowingly and voluntarily and without threat or coercion, used an electronic communication 
device to transmit an image of himself or herself to the person.”) (to be codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 2827(d)).  
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pornography convictions.  This legislation also prevents prosecutors from labeling juveniles 
convicted of sexting as sex offenders.  Under Vermont’s revised law, even minors convicted of 
this behavior more than once would not be eligible for sex offender status (although under the 
legislation they may be prosecuted in a district court rather than family or juvenile court). 
Several other states have taken the approach of providing an educational, rather than a 
criminal law, solution to the problem of sexting.  In the wake of a 2009 incident in which a 
fourteen-year-old girl was charged with distributing child pornography for posting nude images 
of herself on her MySpace account, New Jersey legislators proposed alternatives to criminal 
prosecutions for those engaging in sexting.203  Such proposed legislation creates a diversionary 
program where minors charged with creating or disseminating sexually explicit images can avoid 
prosecution by completing an educational program focusing on the legal and non-legal 
consequences (including the effect on relationships and the loss of future job opportunities) of 
such acts.204  Under the proposed legislation, prosecutors have the discretion to divert any minor 
charged with distribution of nude or sexually explicit images into the program. 
States should follow the lead of Vermont and New Jersey and revise their child 
pornography and related laws to expressly exempt typical incidents of sexting, consistent with 
the protections the First Amendment extends to minors communicating non-obscene sexually 
themed expression that does not constitute a proximate link to sexual abuse or exploitation of 
children.  Congress should follow this lead as well and revise federal child pornography laws to 
recognize and protect minors’ rights to engage in sexually themed communications of the kind 
described above. 
                                                 
203 See S. 2926, 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009); see also Toutant, supra note 52.  
204 S. 2926, 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009). 
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If legislators are unwilling to assume the important but politically unpopular task of 
revising their child pornography laws to account for the First Amendment rights of minors, then 
courts construing such laws should recognize and protect these rights.  The first appellate court 
to construe state child pornography laws as applied to sexting did just that in Miller v. 
Mitchell.205  In that case, the underlying facts of which were discussed above,206 the district 
attorney threatened to prosecute several teenagers under child pornography laws unless they 
attended an extensive education program designed by the district attorney.207  The parents of 
three of the implicated girls sued the district attorney under § 1983, claiming that this action 
constituted retaliation against their daughters in violation of the girls’ First Amendment rights to 
appear in the photographs, the girls’ right to be free from being compelled to attend the re-
education program, and the parents’ substantive due process rights to direct their children’s 
upbringing.208 
The district court ruled in favor of the parents, finding, inter alia, that because the pictures 
were not illegal under Pennsylvania’s child pornography law, the only reason to prosecute them 
would be in retaliation for exercising their constitutional right not to participate in the district 
attorney’s education program.209  In enjoining the district attorney from initiating criminal 
charges against the girls in connection with the photographs or their refusal to attend the 
education program, the district court found that under Pennsylvania law, “plaintiffs make a 
reasonable argument that the images presented to the court do not appear to qualify in any way 
                                                 
205 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
206 See text accompanying supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–27. 
207 Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d at 143–44. 
208 Id. at 147–48. 
209 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009). aff'd sub nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139. 
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as depictions of prohibited sexual acts.”210  The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
education program required by the district attorney impermissibly violated the daughters’ First 
Amendment right not to engage in compelled speech and the parents’ right to raise their children 
without undue state interference.211 
In summary, legislatures should revise their child pornography laws to exempt acts of 
sexting from their reach and ensure that such laws are not used to harm the very people they 
were designed to protect.  Failing that, courts should construe state child pornography laws 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent to protect the First Amendment rights of the minors 
involved and the due process rights of their parents to direct the upbringing of their children free 
of undue state interference. 
VI. Privacy Not Pornography 
A. Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
In some examples discussed in Part II, nude or sexually themed images of minors, 
initially created with the subject’s permission, were then disseminated or otherwise made 
available beyond the scope of the subject’s consent.  This Article contends that although such 
incidents do not support criminal child pornography charges, they may nonetheless constitute 
harmful and actionable invasions of privacy. 
Under most states’ privacy laws, the transmission of a nude or sexually explicit picture 
without the subject’s consent constitutes an invasion of privacy as a publication of a private 
“fact.”212  As set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
                                                 
210 Id. at 645. 
211 Mitchell, 598 F. 3d at 155. 
212 See infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another 
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter 
publicized is of a kind that 
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.213 
Although there is a First Amendment defense for the publication of information or images 
revealing private facts that are “newsworthy” or otherwise a legitimate matter of public concern, 
in the overwhelming majority of sexting cases—where one teenager forwards a nude picture of 
the subject to other friends or classmates, for example—this “newsworthiness” exception would 
not apply.  Furthermore, under the public disclosure of private facts branch of the invasion of 
privacy tort, truth does not serve as an affirmative defense.214  The publication of the private 
facts tort encompasses, for example, making available information about the fact that an 
individual has a sexually transmitted disease or revealing information about a person’s sexual 
orientation, if such information has not previously been revealed to the public, is not legitimately 
newsworthy, and if publication of this information would be offensive to a reasonable person.  
The public disclosure of private fact tort would encompass acts of sexting in which an image is 
shared without or beyond the subject’s consent. 
Courts in many jurisdictions have held that the dissemination of nude, semi-nude, or 
similarly revealing pictures of an individual without or beyond that individual’s consent are 
actionable invasions of privacy as publications of private facts.215  In G.J.D. v. Johnson, for 
                                                 
213 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
214 See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 175 (2011) (“Truth, while a defense to an action of libel, is not a defense to 
an action for an invasion of the right of privacy.”) (footnotes omitted). 
215 See York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963) (police taking and circulating nude photographs of plaintiff, 
which were allegedly taken to obtain evidence of bruises from assault, may give rise to an invasion of privacy 
claim); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (defendant newspaper liable for publishing 
photograph of plaintiff’s skirt blowing up over her waist at county fair fun house); Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 525 
P.2d 984 (Idaho 1974) (television station that aired footage of plaintiff being arrested and emerging naked from his 
house could be held liable for invasion of privacy); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984); 
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example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed an award of compensatory and punitive 
damages to a woman whose former partner distributed nude pictures of her throughout the 
community.216  Similarly, in a case where a plaintiff voluntarily created nude photographs of 
herself on film and brought the film to defendant’s photofinishing shop to be developed, the 
defendant was found liable for invasion of privacy when an employee developed and circulated 
those photographs to a group of individuals without the plaintiff’s consent.217  Further, in a case 
where the plaintiff consented to be photographed nude for the limited purpose of publication in a 
book, the court held the defendant liable for invasion of privacy because he exceeded the scope 
of the consent by publishing one of the photographs in a newspaper.218  Some courts have held 
that posting on the Internet video footage of individuals engaging in sexual activity constitutes a 
violation of the individuals’ right to privacy (even where the subject is a public figure, such as 
Pamela Lee Anderson, who previously consented to making other nude photos available to the 
public).219 
                                                                                                                                                             
Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002). See generally Myers v. U.S. Camera Publ’g Corp., 167 
N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (nudity is a private fact giving rise to damages when shown beyond persons to 
whom consent is given); Gallon v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (publication of nude 
photograph without authorization is an invasion of privacy).  For academic commentary, see generally Peter B. 
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complaint against Wal-Mart and its photo department employees who allegedly distributed nude photos of plaintiffs, 
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218 McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (defendant newspaper liable when plaintiff 
consented to being photographed nude in the bathtub for publication in a book but not in a newspaper). 
219 Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
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Although posting a nude or sexually explicit image of an individual on the Internet would 
readily satisfy the “public” aspect of the public disclosure of private facts tort, it is less clear 
whether forwarding such an image to a handful of other acquaintances would satisfy this 
element.  The case law suggests that, while revealing such images to one person does not suffice 
for “public” disclosure, sharing images with (at least) a handful of others—as occurs in the 
typical sexting context—would satisfy the publicity requirement.  For example, in Lemnah v. 
American Breeders Service, Inc., the court held that where only one person had received the 
communication (that the plaintiff was fired for drunkenness), there was not the kind of publicity 
necessary to sustain a public disclosure of private fact claim.220  However, in several cases that 
involved dissemination of private information to (at least) a handful of other people, courts have 
considered such dissemination to be “public” enough to constitute a valid claim for public 
disclosure of a private fact.  For example, in Bolduc v. Bailey, the defendant accused the 
plaintiff, a priest, of several criminal and moral offenses.221  The defendant communicated these 
accusations in a series of conversations with fellow members of the plaintiff’s religious 
society.222  Even though the defendant did not communicate the accusations to the public at 
large—only to a limited group—the court found that the complaint properly pled an invasion of 
privacy for public disclosure of private facts.223 
Accordingly, individuals who possess “sexting” images with the subject’s initial assent 
and further disseminate sexting images beyond the subject’s initial consent are liable for 
invading the privacy of the subject, and are properly subject to damages and injunctive relief.  
                                                 
220 482 A.2d 700, 704 (Vt. 1984). 
221 586 F. Supp. 896, 899 (D. Colo. 1984). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 901. 
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For example, in the case described above in which Phillip Alpert e-mailed nude pictures of his 
former girlfriend to seventy of her e-mail contacts, Phillip would be liable in an invasion of 
privacy action brought by his former girlfriend for public disclosure of private facts for sharing 
this image with a large number of other individuals.224 
B. Intermediary Liability for Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
Individuals who disseminate nude, semi-nude or otherwise sexually explicit images of 
minors to others without or beyond the subject’s consent should be held accountable under the 
publication of private fact branch of the invasion of privacy tort.  However, the subject’s ability 
to sue the disseminator for damages or injunctive relief may provide incomplete relief, especially 
in circumstances in which the image is made available by a website run by another party such as 
MySpace or Facebook.  Given the current state of the law, it is exceedingly difficult for an 
individual to hold a website liable in tort for any type of harm resulting from the website’s 
publication of an image.  While these social networking sites generally undertake measures to 
remove such images (once made aware of them), 47 U.S.C. § 230, enacted by the CDA, 
immunizes such sites from liability for their role in making such images available.225  Below, 
this Article argues that § 230(c) should be revised or reinterpreted by courts to reach a more 
privacy-protective outcome. 
In passing the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Congress sought to remedy 
perceived ills caused by certain types of offensive expression on the Internet using two different 
approaches.  First, the CDA prohibited the transmission of certain types of sexually themed 
                                                 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 38–49. 
225 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 133, 138 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006)). 
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expression on the Internet.226  These provisions prohibiting the transmission of “indecent”227 
content and prohibiting the display of “patently offensive”228 content were insufficiently 
attentive to the First Amendment rights of individuals, and, as discussed above,229 were quickly 
struck down by the Supreme Court.230  Second, Congress also sought to respond to earlier 
decisions that held websites liable for defamatory content posted by subscribers.  Earlier cases 
treated websites as publishers of information made available by the website’s subscribers and 
held the websites secondarily liable for defamation and related torts.  In one early case in 
particular, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., the website had reserved and 
exercised editorial control over the content made available by its subscribers.231  The court in 
Stratton Oakmont held that such control rendered the website a publisher of the defamatory 
content made available by its subscriber.232  In response to pleas by website owners to immunize 
them from liability in such circumstances, Congress passed § 230(c), which both encourages 
websites to continue to engage in acts of good faith exercises of editorial control—such as by 
blocking objectionable material233—and immunizes them from liability for publishing or 
distributing harmful material made available by their subscribers.  This provision of § 230(c) 
                                                 
226 Id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 133–134 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223). 
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228 See supra text accompanying note 197. 
229 See supra text accompanying notes 197–206. 
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stipulates that “[n]o provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”234 
These provisions of the CDA achieve their purpose to the extent that they immunize 
interactive computer services and websites from liability, like Prodigy, that cannot be expected 
to control ex ante every post made by every subscriber.235  Since this provision became law, 
however, countless websites have successfully claimed immunity from a broad range of lawsuits 
for making available content posted by others—both as an initial matter and after the harmful 
nature of such content has been asserted by the plaintiff.  Indeed, courts have extended § 230(c)’s 
immunity well beyond defamation, to other state causes of action, such as negligence and gross 
negligence,236 nuisance,237 sending threatening messages,238 and even statutory violations of the 
                                                 
234 Id. § 230(c)(1).  Although the statutory language here refers to “interactive computer service,” which is 
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library’s computers which did not restrict Internet access to minors). 
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Fair Housing Act and related anti-discrimination violations.239  Section 230 expressly provides 
that its immunity does not extend to federal criminal law, including liability for obscenity or for 
sexual exploitation of children,240 nor does it extend to liability for intellectual property 
violations.241  Additionally, the statute explicitly provides that it does not prevent states from 
enforcing any state law that is consistent with this section.242  However, in construing § 230 in 
the context of defenses asserted by ISPs and websites, courts have extended this statutory 
provision unnecessarily broadly and have provided website defendants with immunity for 
hosting sexually explicit content that is inconsistent with the limited purpose of the statute.   
Consider, for example, Barnes v. Yahoo, in which the Ninth Circuit extended broad 
immunity to Yahoo.243  In 2004, Cecilia Barnes’s ex-boyfriend created unauthorized Yahoo 
profiles of Cecilia and posted nude pictures of Cecilia on the profiles.244  The profile pages 
provided Cecilia’s work phone number and e-mail address and led viewers to believe that Cecilia 
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244 Id. at 1098. 
 53 
was seeking to engage in casual sexual relations.245  Not surprisingly, strangers began contacting 
Cecilia at work by phone and e-mail, as well as showing up at her workplace.246  Cecilia 
contacted Yahoo several times over the next few months to request that the profile be removed, 
to no avail.247  A local television reporter learned of Cecilia’s situation and began to prepare a 
news story on the subject.248  When the reporter contacted Yahoo on Cecilia’s behalf, Yahoo’s 
communications director promised that she would make sure the profiles were removed.249  
When Yahoo still had not acted on its express promise to remove the profiles almost two months 
later, Cecilia brought suit against the company.250 
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit held that Barnes’ tort claim against Yahoo for negligent 
undertaking was barred by § 230(c).251  However, Barnes was also able to assert a contractual 
claim of promissory estoppel against Yahoo for failing to make good on its express promise to 
remove the images.252  Only because Yahoo expressly promised to Barnes that it would promptly 
remove the offending material, but failed to do so, could Barnes proceed in her action against 
Yahoo.253  The Ninth Circuit made clear that absent an express promise on the part of the 
website hosting such offending content that it would remove such content, a plaintiff’s claim will 
be barred by § 230(c).254 
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The immunity § 230 grants websites for harms arising from their subscribers’ speech has 
been extended too far.  Websites like Yahoo and Facebook, presented with notice and clear 
evidence that the subject of a nude or sexually explicit image did not consent to posting the 
image (as in the Barnes v. Yahoo case), should be required to promptly remove that image or 
face liability for violating that individual’s privacy.255  A similar regime in the copyright 
infringement context provides a helpful model.  Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a 
copyright owner who believes his or her material has been infringed may provide notice to a 
website stating his or her belief that the website is hosting infringing content.256  Upon receipt of 
such notice, the website must immediately cease hosting such allegedly infringing content in 
order to secure the benefits of the statute’s limitations on liability.257  Unlike § 230, which courts 
have construed to provide broad immunity to websites regardless of whether they remove the 
offensive content identified by the subject, the corresponding copyright provisions require the 
website to act in good faith upon notice to remove the offending content in order to secure the 
limitation of liability.  Although an obligation to remove such allegedly offensive content, if 
imposed too broadly, may lead to a chilling of free speech and fair use rights,258 in the limited 
context of nude or sexually explicit images that the subject can conclusively establish have been 
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posted without her consent, there is no similar danger that websites’ free speech rights will be 
unduly chilled.  In construing § 230, courts should hold that a website that fails to remove such 
images upon notice and receipt of proper documentation from the subject has participated in the 
invasion of privacy and is indirectly liable for such conduct.  Interpreting the statutory language 
that “[n]o [service] provider . . . shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider,”259 courts should conclude that when a 
website refuses to take down the images in a timely manner upon proper request, such material is 
no longer material that is made available by “another information content provider,” but 
becomes material made available by the website itself, for which it is liable. 
VII. Conclusion 
As teenagers explore their sexuality and seek to memorialize and exchange information 
related to their sexual development, their instantaneous ability to memorialize and share images 
with others, via cell phones or the Internet, presents a host of new problems to which our society 
must respond intelligently.  The recent trend of harshly punishing these teens under the child 
pornography regime is not an intelligent solution.  In light of this wave of prosecutorial 
overreaching, state and federal child pornography laws should be revised to specifically exempt 
sexting by minors from the reach of such laws.  Child pornography laws were created to punish 
and deter a far different class of conduct—the conduct of adult pedophiles creating and 
disseminating images that depict sexual abuse of their child victims in a commercial context—
not the conduct of older minors using technology to explore their sexuality and voluntarily 
exchange images with one another.  Non-obscene depictions of nudity or sexual conduct created 
                                                 
259 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
 56 
by teens and exchanged voluntarily among themselves for noncommercial purposes should be 
specifically excluded from the applicable definitions of child pornography and similar crimes. 
Instances of sexting, however, should not necessarily go unpunished, as they may 
constitute harmful invasions of the subject’s privacy.  In cases in which nude or sexually themed 
images of minors, which were initially created with the subject’s consent, are disseminated or 
otherwise made available without or beyond the scope of the subject’s consent, such conduct 
should be cognizable as actionable invasions of the subject’s privacy under the publication of 
private facts branch of this common law tort.  The subject should be able to seek relief not only 
against the individual who made such images available without her consent, but also against a 
website that continues to host such images after being notified of their presence.  Websites that 
continue to facilitate the hosting of such images after the subject requests their removal should 
lose their immunity for hosting such content and should be held liable for facilitating the 
invasion of the subject’s privacy. 
